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Abstract 
 
Pragmatism is often seen as an unpolitical doctrine. This article argues that it is shares 
important commitments with realist political theory, which stresses the distinctive character 
of the political and the difficulty of viewing political theory simply as applied ethics, and that 
many of its key arguments support realism. Having outlined the elective affinities between 
realism and pragmatism, this paper goes on to consider this relationship by looking at two 
recent elaborations of a pragmatist argument in contemporary political theory, which pull in 
different directions, depending on the use to which a pragmatist account of doxastic 
commitments is put. In one version, the argument finds in these commitments a set of pre-
political principles, of the sort that realists reject. In the other version, the account given of 
these commitments more closely tracks the concerns of realists and tries to dispense with 
the need for knowledge of such principles.  
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I. 
The political seems to be difficult terrain for pragmatists. The most prominent pragmatist 
social and political theorist, John Dewey, forcefully presses an avowedly unpolitical 
conception of democracy, as Òprimarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint 
communicated experienceÓ, Òthe idea of community life itselfÓ, or a Òpersonal way of 
individual lifeÓ (e.g., Dewey 1916: 93; Dewey 1927: 328; Dewey 1939: 226). Pragmatism is 
often thought to view politics as primarily a matter of collective problem-solving, glossing 
over core political phenomena such as power and conflict which subvert the hopes for 
such a shared enterprise.  
The purpose of this article is to explore the relationship of pragmatism to the ÒrealistÕ 
current in recent political theory which has sought to emphasise the specifically political 
character of political theorising. The recent interest in realism in political theory seeks to 
trace the distinctive contours of politics as a dimension of human activity and to overturn 
what it identifies as the moralistic tendencies in political philosophy.1 The paper begins by 
offering an overview of key realist themes and the overlap between these themes and 
pragmatist commitments. With this basic position blocked out, the paper goes on to 
explore two contrasting recent versions of a pragmatist political argument, developed by 
Cheryl Misak and Robert Talisse, on the one hand, and by Thomas Fossen, on the other. 
These pull in different directions, I will suggest, depending on the account they offer of 
practical doxastic commitments and the implications that they draw from this. In the first 
version, the argument finds in these commitments a set of pre-political principles, of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 For a guide to the state of play, see Rossi and Sleat 2014. Overviews and influential 
statements are discussed below but include Bell 2008; Freeden 2005; Galston 2010; 
Geuss 2008; Mouffe 2005; Newey 2001; Williams 2005. 
! 3 
!
sort that realists reject. In the other version, the account given of these commitments tries 
to dispense with the need for knowledge of such principles.  
It should be noted that pragmatism and realism are both constituted by an 
undisciplined rabble of doctrines, temperaments and sensibilities: there is no scope to do 
justice to this variety and I will impose some artificial tidiness on each position. Further, 
this is not a study in influence or ÒgenealogyÓ. For some realists, pragmatists are indeed an 
interesting reference point or source of inspiration: Raymond Geuss (2001) and Chantal 
Mouffe (2001) for example are directly responsive to authors usually classified as 
pragmatist. For others, notably Williams in much of his later work, Richard Rorty in 
particular serves as a foil and a goad: however far Williams was going, it was not that far, 
or in that direction (Williams 2002, 2005). However, nothing in the following discussion 
hangs on establishing paths of influence.2  
 
II. 
The realistÕs primary commitment is to viewing political theory as a distinct enterprise, and 
politics as a particular practice constituted by a distinctive set of concerns. In particular, 
realists are skeptical about governing politics with reference to antecedent moral 
principles. We should not view political theory as applied ethics, for which ÒÔ[p]ureÓ ethics 
as an ideal theory comes first, then applied ethics, and politics is a kind of applied ethicsÓ 
(Geuss 2008: 9; cf. Williams 2005: 2). From this perspective, the key danger in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Further, Ian Hacking suggests in an engaging intellectual self-portrait that one can 
subscribe to a bundle of pragmatist commitments while resisting the invitation to self-
identify as a pragmatist or even as inspired by pragmatists (Hacking 2007; cf. Quine 
1981). Misak (2013) makes an ambitious and scholarly case for the prevalence of 
pragmatism among analytic philosophers even during the period of its alleged ÒeclipseÓ. 
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contemporary political thought is to collapse the distinctive normativity of political thinking 
into political moralism, confusing politics and morality. Moralism embodies a kind of 
reductionist view of political thinking, which fails to acknowledge the distinctiveness or 
autonomy of political thinking by viewing it only as moral theory applied to a particular 
subject matter.3 Political moralism, in WilliamsÕs account, characteristically takes one of 
two forms. Enactment models formulate a particular set of moral principles and values 
which then require implementation through political institutions and the use of power, as 
with utilitarianism, on WilliamsÕs view. 4 Structural models pick out a set of moral 
constraints on institutions and power, as in the kind of Kantian approach Williams finds in 
RawlsÕs political liberalism, which rests political legitimacy only on principles all can accept. 
There are at least two distinguishable versions of this claim for the autonomy of the 
political. In its categorical form, it is the claim that guidance in politics is only possible by 
sui generis political values and standards, and other types of value (ethical, religious, 
aesthetic, etc.) may play no legitimate role: this is the Òhard-edgedÓ realism identified with 
some classical IR and Realpolitik. So if we view material self-interest and power as all that 
matter for politics, for instance, other candidates for guiding political action should fall 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 The term ÒmoralismÓ is used in other ways, of course, including by realists: see Ivison 
(2005), Geuss (2010: 31-42).  
4 Cf. Dunn (1989: 214) on the Òthe presumption, as compulsively attractive to modern 
political moralists like Lenin or Mao or Hayek or the paladins of social democracy as it was 
to Plato or Cardinal Richelieu, that the solution to the problems of politics is to concentrate 
power in just the right hands or at the service of just the right valuesÓ. There is 
unfortunately not the space to consider the rather different conception of political moralism 
from the more constricted use in the very recent literature. 
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away as irrelevant intrusions.5 The onus then falls on the hard-edged realist to give an 
argument to the effect that we know a priori that all moral, legal, ethical, etc., 
considerations can, or should, be excluded from properly political thinking.  
The realists who concern us here endorse a weaker form of the realist claim for the 
autonomy of the political, to the effect that politically realistic thinking should give Ôa greater 
autonomy to distinctively political thoughtÕ (Williams 2005: 3; cf. Geuss 2008: 99; Philp 
2012: 634). While power, conflict and disagreement for realists form the Òcircumstances of 
politicsÓ (Waldron 1999: 102-8; Weale 1999: 8-13; cf. Geuss 2008: 25-8; Williams 2005: 5-
6, 59-60; Mouffe 2000; Newey 2001; Galston 2010), they usually seek to distinguish 
political relationships from relations of mere domination, violence or terror (Williams (2005: 
5; cf. Mouffe 2005). What is crucial is that moral and political considerations should not be 
confused. In a well-known example of WilliamsÕs, judging humanitarian intervention on the 
model of individual rescue misses what is distinctively political about this kind of decision: 
for example, that it involves a powerful actor, such as a powerful state or coalition of states 
identifying itself as the salient rescuer, that Òimperial assistanceÓ brings with it Òimperial 
controlÓ, that interventions need to be democratically legitimated, that decisions to 
intervene are not decisions to intervene personally but to deploy others to do so, and that 
they have long-run domestic and international political consequences (Williams 2005: 145-
53; cf. Dunn 1995:136-47). In this case, acknowledging the autonomy of the political 
involves attentiveness to a diverse and contextually variable range of considerations 
specific to the political dilemma that viewing intervention specifically on the model of 
individual rescue tends to miss.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Of course, there is a complex intellectual historiography here. In relation to the current 
crop of realists in political theory, see Geuss 2010: 38-9, Scheuerman 2013, Sleat 2014. 
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The second commitment is to the primacy of practice, encapsulated in WilliamsÕs 
adoption of GoetheÕs phrase (famously used by Wittgenstein) ÒIn the beginning was the 
deedÓ (Williams 2005: 14-15, 24-8). Answering the demand for legitimation is a matter of 
providing a response in particular historical circumstances, not of arriving at a solution in 
the state of nature before handing off this solution for implementation  (Williams 2005:  3, 
29-39, 62, 65-7; Geuss 2008: 8, 16-7, 24-5). In part, as Marc Stears and Bonnie Honig 
point out, awareness of practical and historical contingency acts as a prophylactic against 
the Òsubversion of the wishÓ, a reminder of the contingent origins, uncontrollable 
consequences and uncertain prospects of political values (Honig and Stears 2011: 186; 
Williams 2002: 153). However, it is important that for realists this anti-foundational stance 
does not pull the rug out from under the possibility of critical thinking about existing 
practices and standards but rather provides a condition for this criticism. ÒWhat we are left 
with, if we reject foundationalismÕ, Williams writes, Ôis not an inactive or functionalist 
conservatism that has to take ethical ideas as they standÓ (Williams 2005: 37). Rather, 
making non-foundationalist ethical thought Ôhistorically and socially realisticÕ creates Ôa 
possibility of deploying some parts of it against others, and of reinterpreting what is 
ethically significant, so as to give a critique of existing institutions, conceptions, prejudices, 
and powersÕ (Williams 2005: 37; Philp 2010: 477). Indeed, one of the features of politics in 
modern societies is self-consciousness of the historically constituted character of their 
values and institutions. One of the flaws of political moralism, by contrast, is its tendency to 
seek to flatten this historical awareness. Williams famously decries a Òuniversalistic 
tendency which encourages it to inform past societies about their failingsÓ Ð playing Kant at 
the court of King Arthur (Williams 2005: 10, 66).  
Third, realists identify a particular ideological aspect to moralismÕs flattening of 
history and contingency, since it encourages Ògeneralizing oneÕs own local prejudices and 
! 7 
!
repackaging them as demands of reasonÓ and distracts from attention to the particular 
power structures of particular societies (Geuss 2005: 39, 52-5; Rossi and Sleat 2015: 4-5; 
Dunn 1990; Humphrey 2012). 
Finally, the emphasis on the primacy of practice and the rejection of moral theory as 
the source of antecedent standards lead to a focus on political judgement and agency in 
specific contexts, Òthe distinctive contribution that can be made by the agency of particular 
individuals within causal constraints, given their skills, professionalism and vocation, and 
the costs of various optionsÓ (Philp 2010: 478). This concern includes, and is often 
expressed as, a Weberian preoccupation with the ethics and pathos of leadership and 
executive decision, but it is hardly exhausted by this focus. In the absence of a 
Òcategorically more reassuring and splendid form of collective life, lurking just over the 
brow of the hill (or in the sybilline pages of Karl Marx or Kropotkin or John Rawls or Hayek 
or Schumacher)Ó, for instance, John Dunn suggests the Òdemocratization of prudenceÓ 
(Dunn 1989: 212-4). However wide we cast the net of political agency, the underlying point 
is that responsibility for judgement falls on the shoulders of particular agents exercising 
their capacities to identify and solve problems as best they can in the circumstances in 
which they find themselves. 
Interpreted in this way, the realist shares some important similarities with the 
pragmatist. Pragmatism endorses the realistÕs doubts about antecedent a priori criteria for 
assessing success in inquiry and action; instead appropriate criteria are hammered out 
through practice, experience and social learning. In his ethical writings, Dewey elaborates 
a view of moral theory not as an antecedent constraint on action but rather as a repertoire 
of conceptual resources and tools for dealing with the problems of value judgement in a 
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world of plural and changing values. 6 In Ethics, Dewey and Tufts offer an interpretation of 
different canonical value theories, teleology, deontology and virtue ethics as providing 
contrasting methodological orientations for identifying, describing and solving problems. 
Instead of asking which of these approaches best captures Òour intuitionsÓ and so should 
be used as an unvarying standard to guide decision-making in concrete situations, Dewey 
argues that no one approach constitutes an theoretically adequate guide to how to act in 
particular situations. Instead, these provide standpoints from which agents can identify and 
analyze problems, sift important from unimportant considerations, and appraise our raw 
preferences (ÒprizingsÓ) and alternative plans of action. Conflict among these approaches 
cannot be resolved in theory Ð only in practice, if at all, where an agent must make Òthe 
best adjustment he can among forces which are genuinely disparateÓ (Dewey 1930: 288; 
Dewey 1920: 173-4; Dewey 1930b; Dewey 1932: 166).  
Second, pragmatists share the realistsÕ methodological commitment to the primacy 
of practice (cf. Putnam 1995: 52).  This is so, first, in that at the core of Deweyan 
pragmatism is a conception of beliefs and judgements as tools or instruments for resolving 
problematic situations. Inquiry is a problem-solving activity, engaged in by particular 
agents: agitated by some doubt, finding ourselves, in DeweyÕs terms, in an Òindeterminate 
situationÓ, we respond with inquiry in order to arrive at beliefs and policies of action that 
can assuage these doubts. Pragmatists also embrace the historical character of belief and 
value. Moral theories are seen as historical products, expressing and embodying the 
societies that produce and sustain them, on this view. We can only begin to reason and 
deliberate on the basis of the beliefs and practices that we have Ð we cannot call 
everything into question all at once. The pragmatist views beliefs both as rooted in history, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 See Welchman 1995, Festenstein 1997, Pappas 2009, Bohman 2010, Fesmire 2003, 
2014. 
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and as subject to rational scrutiny. The criteria for what counts as success or failure in 
inquiry are not pre-given and external to inquiry, but are hammered out through it: Òwhat 
we have are practices which are right are wrong, depending on how they square with our 
standards. And our standards are right or wrong depending on how they square with our 
practices. This is a circle or, better, a spiralÓ Ð but a virtuous one (Putnam 1990: 304). For 
the pragmatist, there is no epistemologically privileged standpoint from which to assess 
either practices or standards. Finally, recognition of the historical character of our 
conceptual resources does not mean we must cleave to Sittlichkeit. DeweyÕs extensive 
writings on liberalism stress the historical sources of notions of the individual, rights, 
freedom, contract, and so on. In part, the point in each case is to explain how theories that 
emerged and were fitted for one particular social context fail to make sense in a different 
context.7 Ensnared by redundant moral notions, we can fail to perceive and respond to the 
distinctive needs of the present. 
Third, Deweyan pragmatism also shares the realistÕs commitment to unmasking 
what Dewey saw as the pernicious effects of repackaging historically embodied moral 
conceptions as universal truths. To take a crucial instance which does seem to have had 
some impact on Geuss, Dewey maintains that a strong distinction between instrumental 
and intrinsic value, as more than an analytical distinction drawn by a particular agent in a 
particular situation, both reflects and reinforces a wider societal division between a 
leisured and a labouring class (cf. Dewey 1922: 160, 185-8; Dewey 1939: 235; Dewey 
1948: 275; Geuss 2001: 124-7; Geuss 2005: 119). 
Fourth, as we have seen, Deweyan pragmatism throws the stress on contextual 
individual judgment, rather than antecedent theory, as the locus of decision-making. In the 
political realm, pragmatists argue that experimental social inquiry takes the place of a priori 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Dewey 1920, 1930a, 1935; Festenstein 1995, 1997; Westbrook 1991; Ryan 1995. 
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moral theory as the basis of social and political decision-making.8 Social and political 
values are notoriously treated not as fixed standards but as revisable hypotheses, the 
implications of which are worked through in practice and which are judged in the light of 
their consequences in the widest sense for everyone involved. Democracy is understood 
as consisting in and as providing the conditions for this ongoing experimental inquiry. It 
consists in this inquiry in the sense that democracy is constituted by consultation, debate, 
and challenge among all citizens, testing out the policies, values and ways of life. Robust 
inquiry requires that we must have access to evidence, arguments, other forms of 
information, and processes of reason-exchange. And democracy provides the institutional 
conditions for this inquiry, through institutionalizing Òeffective guarantees of free inquiry, 
free assembly and free communicationÓ as well as ways of holding rulers to account and of 
informing them of their mistakes (Dewey 1939: 227; Dewey 1927: 290-3, 364-6). 
 
III. 
One way of developing the pragmatist view of democracy as inquiry is as an account of 
antecedent epistemological constraints on the political, grounded not in a moral theory but 
in the pragmatist conception of inquiry.  
This has been the thrust of the Peircean line of argument pursued by Cheryl Misak 
and Robert Talisse. The pragmatist conception of inquiry, this line of argument runs, tells 
us what we are committed to if we want true beliefs: in MisakÕs pithy formulation, Òthe 
requirements of genuine belief show that we must, broadly speaking, be democratic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 E.g., Anderson 2006; Bohman 1999; Festenstein 1997, Festenstein 2001, Festenstein 
2007, Festenstein 2008, Festenstein 2010a; Kaufman-Osborn 1991; Knight and Johnson 
1999; Knight and Johnson 2011; Putnam 1994: 198-220; Westbrook 2005: 175-200. Some 
other important work is cited below. 
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inquirersÓ (Misak, 2000: 106).9 So, at least where we experience doubt, the search for a 
well-grounded belief involves testing claims against as wide a range of different 
experiences as possible, rendering our beliefs responsive to reasons and evidence. In 
particular, it requires us to seek out and attend to different perspectives and arguments, in 
order to test and, if necessary, revise our current conceptions: the search for Òtruth 
requires us to listen to others and anyone might be an expertÓ (Misak 2000: 96). In this 
interpretation, our deeper shared commitment to arriving at and sustaining true beliefs is a 
value that needs to be implemented in and through politics, and shapes political order. No 
matter what particular political views we embrace, we nevertheless share, and should 
recognize that we share, a commitment to arriving at true beliefs. This shared commitment 
means that adherents to dogma and tradition should reject the methods they have relied 
on to fix their beliefs and instead embrace pragmatist democracy: 
[T]hose who would turn their backs on democracy in favor of an autocracy, in favor 
of a religious hierarchy, or in favor of a might-makes-right regime, are failing to see 
that they betray their own practices of arguing, asserting and defending their views, 
big and small. For as soon as one engages in the practice of giving and asking for 
reasons, one manifests oneÕs commitment to the assessment of reasons and to the 
considering of reasons, whether they come from a powerless group, from the 
religiously misguided, or from the despised. One also manifests oneÕs commitment 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 See Misak 2000, 2004, 2009; 2007, 2010, 2011, 2014; Misak and Talisse 2014; Talisse 
2007, 2011a, 2011b, 2014. For analysis, see Bacon 2010; Festenstein 2004, 2009, 2010a, 
2010b; MacGilvray 2013. Talisse interprets this argument as an epistemological variant of 
Rawlsian political liberalism, which offers a different conception of the distinctness of the 
political from the realistÕs: I discuss the issues raised by this interpretation in Festenstein 
2010a. 
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to preserving a social-epistemic environment within which reliable assessments of 
this kind can be made (Misak and Talisse 2014: 10-11) 
Authoritarians betray their own cognitive commitments, according to this line of thought.  
Positing a shared commitment to a common theory of knowledge which structures 
political thinking is just as counter-political as a recognized and shared commitment to a 
common moral theory which structures political thinking. A pragmatist may claim 
exemption from the realist critique on the grounds that, unlike moralism, this argument 
makes only a relatively uncontentious epistemological claim not a controversial moral 
assumption of the sort that provokes realist criticism. After all, we may think, no matter 
what the content of our beliefs, we all desire them to be true. However, for the realist, this 
seems susceptible to the objection directed at moralism (cf. Williams 2005: 16).  
For this epistemological pragmatist argument to have any bite in relation to 
autocrats, religious hierarchs, or proponents of might makes right, it needs not only to 
show what follows from subscribing to pragmatism but what follows for them, given their 
other practical commitments. The authoritarian must be confronted with a practical 
dilemma, as well as a reason to choose in a particular way: either to betray her particular 
conception of social order or vision of the good life (and perhaps also her own interests 
and those of her clique) or to betray her doxastic commitments, as outlined by the 
pragmatist. While this pragmatist argument (if the authoritarian is carried along by it) offers 
a reason for the authoritarian to think that this is a dilemma, it does not tell her why she 
has to grasp one horn rather than another, why the considerations thrown up by the 
pragmatist argument should have practical priority.  
The pragmatist can respond that it is enough to show that the authoritarian is in a 
state of epistemic disorder, failing to act on the doxastic commitments she ought to 
recognize (cf. Talisse 2010). Yet this response seems to instance exactly what realists 
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worry about in political moralism, the abstraction of a particular epistemological 
consideration, which is then given priority over other political considerations. The 
pragmatist may also make the very forceful point that over time such a regime is 
cognitively unstable, poorly equipped to arrive at and sustain well-grounded beliefs on the 
basis of which to act. Of course rulers may still promote other values (security, 
development) above cognitive stability, and in particular instances it is an empirical 
question whether the trade-off is justified. And rulers (like some of the rest of us) may in 
any case operate on a blend of KeynesÕs maxim (that in the long run weÕre all dead) and 
MicawberÕs (that something will turn up), one or both of which is invariably valid (cf. Geuss 
2008: 3). Now saying that this conception of inquiry is itself politically contentious is neither 
to claim that there is an alternative which will do the job or providing a reason for the 
authoritarian to dismantle her regime nor to say that Òanything goesÓ. It is only to say that it 
is embedded within the realm of political controversy. Lots of well-grounded (indeed, true) 
beliefs are politically contentious Ð that is, they cannot be assumed to form part of a 
commonly accepted framework within which politics is conducted. 
 
IV. 
The other version of this pragmatic turn that I want to focus on also takes its starting point 
from the idea that we incur non-discretionary commitments in our practices of believing, 
claiming, asserting and declaring things. In what Thomas Fossen (2011: 391) calls, a trifle 
inelegantly, Òsystematic agonistic social pragmatismÓ, he aims to develop an alternative to 
normativism Ð a version of moralism as outlined here (cf. Fossen 2014: 232; 2012: 431). 
For normativism, the main task for political philosophy (concerning legitimacy) is to 
formulate and justify principles and criteria that specify the conditions of legitimacy. This 
constitute Òa kind of knowledge that can subsequently be applied in actual situations in 
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which the legitimacy of political authority is questionedÓ and allows us to Òdetermine 
whether a claim to legitimacy is correct with reference to those principlesÓ (Fossen 2012: 
430-1).  
Fossen sketches a different image of norms, drawing on Robert BrandomÕs 
imposing architectonic of Òthe implicit structure characteristic of discursive practice as 
suchÓ (Brandom 1994: 374, Brandom 2000, Brandom 2002).  Norms arise within practices 
of giving and asking for reasons, and in accepting reasons and making claims participants 
bind themselves to standards that go beyond their subjective interpretation of their 
commitments. What it is for us to think of ourselves and others as normative beings is as 
capable of undertaking commitments, ascribing them to others and accepting responsibility 
for them. Calling an authority legitimate or illegitimate is a matter of Òtaking a stanceÓ in a 
linguistic practice, attributing various commitments and entitlements to oneself and other 
participants: it is only Òfrom an engaged standpoint, in virtue of subjects taking stances 
from different perspectivesÓ that Òthere such a thing as political legitimacy at allÓ (Fossen 
2012: 442). To take a claim to authority to be legitimate is to accept commitments to obey 
while to reject it is to accept commitments to treat it as a coercive imposition.  These 
ÒstancesÓ are not arbitrary: if I claim that the polity is legitimate, I make a further claim that 
this is more than my opinion. From the perspective of a participant in claim-making, 
Òstances (including oneÕs own) are liable to evaluation, and participants can be held 
responsible for themÓ (Fossen 2012: 442). In other words, in engaging in discursive 
practice we distinguish between the commitments that we happen to accept and those that 
it is appropriate to accept.  Finally, Fossen insists on a dimension of agonal contestation in 
discursive practice. Just as in the agon what counts as excellence is not fixed in advance 
but emerges through the contest, in discursive practice Òwhat is true, correct or meaningful 
is not determined in advance of the practice, or identified with any individual subjectÕs 
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assessment of it or with that of the community as a whole. Rather, it is a function of the 
engagement, as assessed from each perspectiveÓ (Fossen 2011: 384). 
Critics respond that Fossen has not shown that the very idea of an external set of 
principles by which to judge political legitimacy is either incoherent or unnecessary (Erman 
and Moller 2014, 2015). Identifying the practice or game as a practice or game does not 
change the options available to participants within it, they argue: the articulation of moral 
principles remains a permissible move in practices of justification, until those practices of 
justification themselves rule them out, and may be a required move if the practices deem it 
so. Of course, one can seek to change these practices in a realist or anti-normativist 
direction but that is an activity within the practices, which, like other moves, is thrown into 
the agonic mixing pot. Further, they argue that it is not clear what difference such an 
approach makes, normatively speaking. The Òclaim that legitimacy Ôcannot be determined 
with certainty, definitively or from a disengaged standpointÕ fails to prohibit or to suggest 
any type of normative theory of legitimacyÓ. Accordingly, FossenÕs line of argument Òis not 
telling us [sc. normativists] to do anything differently from what we already doÓ (Erman and 
Moller 2014: 15). There is nothing that follows from recognizing the pragmatist framework 
as such that renders appeal to such principles within practices of justification 
impermissible.  
 However, we have seen that the characteristic pragmatist move is not skepticism 
about theories and principles in this sense but to interpret them as tools for deliberation 
and problem-solving in particular contexts. So this normativist response seems to miss the 
point of this pragmatist argument. This rejects the idea that having a grasp of the concept 
of legitimacy must take the form of theoretical knowledge of antecedent principles that 
determine how we evaluate particular contexts and that without this knowledge, there is 
only arbitrariness. So the question becomes whether or not the normativist can sustain the 
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account of principle as foundational in this sense, as well as whether or not the 
pragmatistÕs inferential account holds water. Of course, this is not the place to offer a 
definitive resolution of these questions, but this does suggest that the normativist response 
does not in itself do enough to establish the vacuity of this pragmatist approach. 
 
V. 
This paper has aimed to open up and air some lines of inquiry, not to settle them, in this 
limited space. Pragmatism provides one way to give philosophical articulation to a range of 
realist commitments, and the debates generated by contemporary pragmatist argument 
bear directly on the realistÕs concerns. I want to close by returning to where we started, 
DeweyÕs notorious image of democracy as a personal way of life is still clearly at some 
remove from the picture of politics offered by, say, Williams (although he is a liberal) or 
Geuss (although he is a radical critic of capitalism). But it is not in itself an image that the 
realist has to repudiate qua realist, and of course Dewey had his own specific theoretical 
and polemical goals in advancing this conception. The realistÕs anti-moralist historicism 
does not in itself provide a determinate picture of the distinctive content and boundaries of 
the political realm, which is unsurprisingly the topic of contention among realists (cf. Honig 
and Stears 2014). Viewing realism through the pragmatist lens reminds us that realists 
cannot help themselves to specific conceptions of the political (as the domain of 
legitimacy, pathos-laden decision, tragic, conflict-ridden, agonistic, a realm of elite action 
or democratic deliberation) without awareness that this conception is exposed to 
contextual and practical trial.  
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